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Financial exclusiona b s t r a c t
This article presents the first systematic investigation of the effects of climate-related vulnerability on
firms’ cost of capital and access to finance and sheds light on a hitherto under-appreciated cost of climate
change for climate vulnerable developing economies. We first show theoretically how climate vulnerabil-
ity could affect firms’ cost of capital and access to finance. Apart from a possible impact on cost of debt
and equity, which drive cost of capital, firms in countries with high exposure to climate risk might be
more financially constrained. The latter results in low levels of debt relative to total assets or equity
due to restricted access to finance. We then examine this issue empirically, using panel data of 15,265
firms in 71 countries over the period 1999–2017. We invoke panel data regressions and structural equa-
tion models, with firm-level data from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database and different measures of
climate vulnerability based on the ND-GAIN climate vulnerability index. We construct a new climate vul-
nerability index and use panel instrumental variable regressions to address endogeneity problems. Our
empirical findings suggest that climate vulnerability increases cost of debt directly and indirectly through
its impact on restricting access to finance. However, we find limited evidence that climate vulnerability
affects cost of equity. Our estimations suggest that the direct effect of climate vulnerability on the aver-
age increase in cost of debt from 1991 to 2017 has been 0.63%. In addition, the indirect effect through
climate vulnerability’s impact on financial leverage has contributed an additional 0.05%.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under theCCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Climate change is having real impact on economies already.
Indeed, the frequency of natural disasters such as droughts,
extreme temperatures, floods, landslides and storms, is on the rise
(IPCC, 2018). This dramatic increase in climate change-related
catastrophes translates into enormous economic costs. The direct
impact of catastrophic natural disasters on economies is empiri-
cally well established (e.g., Cavallo, Galiani, Noy, & Pantano,
2013; Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014; Ferreira & Karali, 2015;
Mendelsohn, Kerry, Chonabayashi, & Bakkensen, 2015; Alano &
Lee, 2016; Botzen, Deschenes, & Sanders, 2019). Moreover, both
gradual global warming and natural disasters are associated withsignificant negative effects on long-run economic growth (e.g.,
Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015; Klomp & Valckx, 2014; Kompas,
Pham, & Che, 2018; Kahn et al., 2019). Although impacts differ
across countries, there is a consensus that the biggest impacts of
climate change are being felt in developing countries.
One interesting dimension of these economic costs relates to
recent empirical evidence by Kling, Lo, Murinde, and Volz (2018)
that climate vulnerability increases the cost of sovereign borrow-
ing: vulnerability to climate risks, as measured by the Notre-
Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) sub-indices for cli-
mate sensitivity and capacity, has increased sovereign cost of debt
by 1.17 percentage points on average for climate vulnerable devel-
oping countries over the last decade. The cost at which govern-
ments can access finance affects public budgets and
governments’ ability to invest in climate mitigation and adapta-
tion; it also constrains possible investments in areas such as infras-
tructure, education and public health.
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how does climate vulnerability affect the private sectors’ cost of
capital and access to finance? In a recent attempt to address
related issues, Huang, Kerstein, and Wang (2018) investigate the
effect of climate-related risk on financing choices by publicly listed
firms covering 54 countries from 1993 to 2012. They find that
firms located in climate vulnerable countries anticipate the likeli-
hood of losses from major storms, flooding, heat waves, and other
adverse weather conditions by holding more cash, less short-term
debt but more long-term debt, and are less likely to distribute cash
dividends. Moreover, firms in certain industries are less vulnerable
to extreme weather and so face less climate-related risks. How-
ever, the more directly relevant question is whether climate vul-
nerability increases firms’ cost of capital and affects their access
to finance. The latter is not covered by Huang et al. (2018) as they
regard a firms’ financing decision as a choice and not a conse-
quence of being financially excluded.
This article examines the alleged impact of climate vulnerability
on cost of capital first theoretically, identifying the main channels
through which an effect can materialise. In summary, cost of cap-
ital refers to a weighted average of cost of debt and cost of equity.
The weights represent the proportion of debt and equity finance.
Theoretically, we outline how climate vulnerability can change
cost of debt and equity. Finally, climate risks can contribute to
financial exclusion as additional risks might make loans unviable
for banks. Usually banks can charge higher interest rates to cover
expected losses; however, frequent climate events might affect
their abilities to predict outcomes and might make firms more vul-
nerable to higher interest rates, leading to credit rationing. Hence,
the pricing mechanism can fail as shown theoretically by Kling
(2018).
Empirically, this article tests these theoretical predictions using
a large-scale panel dataset covering 15,265 firms in 71 countries
over the period 1999–2017. First, we show that the ND-GAIN cli-
mate vulnerability index, the most widely used measure of climate
vulnerability, is endogenous due to its close relationship with eco-
nomic variables. Hence, to assess the impact of climate vulnerabil-
ity on cost of capital, an instrument is needed. From raw data used
by ND-GAIN to construct their indices, we redesign an index less
correlated with macroeconomic variables. Second, we derive initial
results for cost of debt and equity using panel instrumental vari-
able regressions. Climate vulnerability does increase cost of debt
– but not cost of equity. Third, to account for the alleged impact
of climate vulnerability on access to finance and high correlations
between GDP per capita and governance measures, we specify
structural equation models. These reveal a direct effect of climate
vulnerability in line with our instrumental variable approach –
but also show an indirect effect as firms located in countries with
high climate related risks exhibit restricted access to finance.
The analysis sheds light on a hitherto under-appreciated cost of
climate change for climate vulnerable developing economies:
higher corporate financing cost and financial exclusion. Both fac-
tors hold back economic development and by restraining fiscal rev-
enue limit the scope of governments to invest in public (climate
resilient) infrastructure and climate adaptation. Underinvestment
in turn curbs growth prospects and puts firms in climate vulnera-
ble developing economies at a disadvantage when competing in
both domestic and export markets. In other words, the climate vul-
nerability risk premium causes a vicious circle, where a higher cost
of capital reduces both sovereign and private sector investment,
suppresses firm growth and tax revenue, and limits the scope for
public adaptation finance.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior
research. Section 3 then discusses theoretically the effect of cli-
mate vulnerability on firms’ cost of capital as well as financial
exclusion of firms. Section 4 provides an overview of the sample,the construction of variables, and a discussion of the ND-GAIN cli-
mate vulnerability index. Section 5 shows our empirical findings
including descriptive statistics, endogeneity tests, panel instru-
mental variable regressions, and structural equation models.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.2. Prior research
The economic impact of climate change on both countries and
corporations is complex and sometimes ambivalent. Several stud-
ies have investigated the relationship between global climate
change and economic performance at the country-level (e.g., Dell,
Jones, & Olken, 2014; Nordhaus, 2006). In addition, studies have
also examined the influence of climate change on firm-level perfor-
mance. Climate change may impact businesses from any industry
and size. Firms may face several climate-related risks such as
emission-reduction regulation and negative reactions from envi-
ronmentally concerned investors or lenders. For instance, Beatty
and Shimshack (2010) explore the relationship between green-
house gas emissions and stock market returns. They find that some
investors tend to react adversely to new information about green-
house gas emissions, leading to a substantial decrease in stock
market valuation between 0.6 and 1.6 percent. Another study by
Konar and Cohen (2001) reports that bad environmental perfor-
mance is negatively associated with the value of intangible assets
of firms.
Even if government regulations intended to curtail greenhouse
gas emissions are not currently introduced in every country, it may
be a significant indicator for environmentally sensitive investors
and lenders which increasingly demand more disclosure from
firms. Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Munoz (2013) collect carbon
emissions data from S&P 500 firms over the period 2006–2008 and
find a negative relationship between carbon emissions and firm
value. Their results suggest that firm value might fall by USD
212,000 for every additional thousand metric tons of carbon
emissions.
Investors are increasingly considering environmental, social
and governance (ESG) performance of businesses before they
take investment decisions. Using data for 13,114 firms for the
period 1992–2007, Chava (2014) identifies the effect of firms’
environmental profile on their cost of equity and debt capital.
According to this research, investors require higher expected
returns from companies that are less concerned about climate
change. Furthermore, Chava (2014) also finds that lenders charge
a significantly lower interest rate on bank loans to environmen-
tally responsible firms. More recently, Huang et al. (2018) anal-
yse a dataset comprising 353,906 observations from 54 countries
and find that climate risk at country level, measured by German-
watch’s Global Climate Risk Index which is based on economic
losses and fatalities from extreme weather events, might be neg-
atively related to firm earnings and positively related to earnings
volatility. Previous research has also indicated that various envi-
ronmental indicators have a positive impact on firms’ cost of
capital. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) examine data from 267
U.S. firms and assert that there is a negative relationship
between environmental risk management and cost of capital,
suggesting that better environmental risk management con-
tributes to reducing firms’ cost of equity.
El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra (2011) analyse data
from 12,915 firms between 1992 and 2007 and find that corporate
social responsibility (CSR) practices have an influence on equity
financing. Dealing with employee relations and environmental
issues decreases firms’ cost of equity. Similarly, Dhaliwal, Li,
Tsang, and Yang (2011) find a negative association between volun-
tary disclosure of CSR activities and firms’ cost of equity capital.
1 We require that the database has information that permits calculating cost of
debt, interest coverage, working capital, financial leverage, firm size, dividends,
tangible assets, and return on assets.
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and analyst coverage.
Climate risks are increasingly recognized as a serious and
worldwide concern for both governments and businesses. This is
also reflected by a growing number of financial supervisors who
are calling on financial firms and corporations to disclose
climate-related financial risks (Monasterolo, Battiston, Janetos, &
Zheng, 2018). However, much uncertainty still exists about the
relation between climate risks and cost of capital. Although some
research has been carried out on the effect of global climate risk
on firm performance using cross-country data (Huang et al.,
2018), there is very little scientific understanding of the impact
of climate risk as a determinant of firms’ cost of capital and access
to finance. This study aims to address this research gap.
3. Theoretical considerations
A firm’s cost of capital refers to its weighted average cost of cap-
ital (WACC), denoted rWACC, which depends on the proportion of
debt finance (D) to debt and equity (D + E), the cost of debt (rD),
the cost of equity (rE) and the marginal tax rate (s). The latter mat-
ters as interest expenses are tax deductible in some countries,
reducing the after-tax cost of capital. Denoting the proportion of
debt finance L = D/(D + E), i.e. financial leverage, (1) states the
WACC:
rWACC ¼ L  rD  1 sð Þ þ ð1 LÞrE ð1Þ
Due to differences in pay-out profiles, equity holders bear more
risk than debt holders, requiring higher expected returns. This
implies rE > rD. It is obvious from (1) that climate vulnerability
(VUL) can increase the WACC rWACC in three ways: (1) oL/oVUL < 0
(shift to equity as it is more difficult to secure debt finance, e.g. due
to volatile cash flows); (2) orD/oVUL > 0 (increased cost of debt);
and (3) orE/oVUL > 0 (increased cost of equity).
Considering the cost of debt, we can state the following compo-
nents, where rf refers to the risk-free rate, d is a default component
(credit spread), and l is a liquidity component. The spread s con-
tains the default and liquidity component:
rD ¼ rf þ DINF þ DEX þ dþ l ¼
XK
k¼1
ckDk þ rf þ s ð2Þ
The risk-free rate usually refers to the yield of ten-year US gov-
ernment bonds. If debt is taken outside the US, country risk needs
to be added (using country dummies Dk with k = 1, 2, . . ., K), and
the expected difference in inflation should be considered DINF. If
debt is denominated in a foreign currency, differences in expected
inflation should be reflected in exchange rates (purchasing power
parity). Thus, an exchange rate effect can be added to (2).
The problem is that, empirically, most of these components can-
not be determined due to lack of data. First, credit default swaps
(CDS) are not available for most companies; hence, we cannot
decompose the spread into a default and liquidity component. This
is not a major limitation as working with annual data should sug-
gest a low average liquidity component. Furthermore, the impact
of climate vulnerability on default risk is more plausible. Second,
financial data does not provide details on USD denominated debt
and debt in other currencies. Hence, using country dummies we
proxy country risk and other factors such as inflation differentials
and exchange rate changes. Alternatively, both factors could be
included in an empirical specification. From Eq. (2), climate vulner-
ability can affect cost of debt in three ways: (1) changing country
risk; (2) influencing the risk-free rate, which seems to be less
likely; (3) increasing the spread mainly due to higher default risk.
Finally, cost of equity is explained using the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM), which links firms’ cost of equity to the risk-freerate, the expected market risk premium and systematic risk
through the beta coefficient. Note that rm refers to the market
return, and E is the expectations operator:
rE ¼ rf þ b Erm  rf
  ð3Þ
Climate vulnerability can increase cost of equity by (1) shifting
the risk-free rate as in the case of cost of debt, (2) changing the
market risk premium, and (3) increasing a firm’s beta coefficient.
The latter point seems to be plausible at first; however, one needs
to note that the market return is the sample average return. Thus,
the average beta cannot increase due to climate change. Further-
more, there are empirical limitations. First, beta coefficients trend
to vary over time. Second, the CAPM has low predictive power in
less developed markets. Hence, it might be better to estimate
country-level betas using countries’ leading stock market index
compared to the MSCI world market index.
The arguments thus far implicitly assume that firms have
access to finance, i.e. firms have a choice between debt and equity
finance reaching their desired leverage L* and raising their
desired level of capital to invest and grow the firm. However,
financial inclusion is not guaranteed and potentially itself a func-
tion of climate vulnerability. Hence, climate vulnerability might
increase cost of debt under the condition that firms have access
to finance, and climate vulnerability might contribute to a higher
probability to be financially excluded. Financial exclusion can be
due to information asymmetry, e.g. banks might struggle to
derive expected default risk in countries exposed to high climate
risk, but also price sensitivity (Kling, 2018). Basically, if higher
interest rates increase default risk (i.e. make liquidity default
more likely), it might be impossible to find an optimal interest
rate that compensates for the expected default risk. This leads
to credit rationing, even in the absence of information
asymmetry.4. Data and variables
4.1. Sampling
Our aim is to assess cost of debt and equity of firms located in
countries with varying climate vulnerability. We use firm-level
data from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database and try to include
as many countries as possible. However, the database does not
provide sufficient data for many small countries with high cli-
mate risk (e.g. Tuvalu). In particular, we try to cover countries
that are members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, which con-
sists of 48 countries. Larger countries in this group such as Ban-
gladesh, Ghana, Vietnam and Kenya can be included in the
sample. For inclusion, we require at least ten companies with
financial data in the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. In total,
our sample contains 95,037 firm-year observations with 18,431
firm-year observations in countries with high climate vulnerabil-
ity (see Section 4.2). Our panel dataset contains 15,265 firms from
71 countries after listwise deletion.1 With 3,683 firms in high-risk
countries, our analysis should be able to assess their cost of capital
and access to finance.
The sample excludes financial firms as their investment and
financing decisions differ from non-financial firms. For instance,
deposit taking banks can finance their loan book through cus-
tomers’ savings. In addition, regulation for financial firms is strict
and includes minimum equity requirements, which affects stan-
dard financial ratios.
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Climate vulnerability data are obtained from the Notre Dame
Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN). This index brings together
74 variables to form 45 core indicators for 181 countries to mea-
sure their environmental vulnerability and their readiness to
adapt. The technical report outlines the methodology and data
sources; hence, we refer to Chen et al. (2015) for a detailed discus-
sion. Our focus is on climate vulnerability, which combines expo-
sure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. The latter is partly
affected by countries’ economic, political and social settings. Geog-
raphy, however, determines a countries’ exposure, which is not a
matter of choice.
Inherently, climate vulnerability is not independent from
macroeconomic conditions, which can cause empirical concerns
such as endogeneity (see Section 5.2). This alleged problem is likely
to be more pronounced when using the ND-GAIN climate readiness
index, which focuses on economic, governance and social mea-
sures. These tend to be highly correlated; an issue we address in
our structural equation model (see Section 5.5).
Exploring the ND-GAIN climate vulnerability index (VUL) for
our sample and period from 1999 to 2017, we must ensure that
countries exhibit a sufficient degree of variability. Otherwise, our
analysis cannot distinguish between country-level fixed effects
(dummies in regressions) and stable climate vulnerability. Fortu-
nately, VUL exhibits some variability over time. For instance, Gam-
bia exhibited an increase of 9.9% from 1995 to 2016, while
Mongolia has improved by 15.9% as it benefits from rising temper-
atures. Section 5.2 explores the ND-GAIN VUL and empirical issues
in more detail.4.3. Construction of variables
The first dependent variable is cost of debt (COD), which we
estimate using interest expense in year t divided by total debt
reported in period t.2 To obtain a firm-level proxy for cost of equity
(COED), our second dependent variable, we rely on dividend pay-
ments relative to the value of equity. In addition, we derive
country-level measures of cost of equity (COE) by estimating country
betas (BETA) and market risk premiums (MRP). Data for the MRP is
obtained from Damodaran (2013). Country betas are estimated using
each countries’ leading stock market index fromwhich we obtain the
stock market return. Countries’ stock return is then regressed on the
return of the US stock market, which provides an estimate of coun-
tries’ beta coefficient.
Financial leverage is a standard control variable and measure of
financial risk. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as the ratio of a firm’s
total debt to total assets. Firms with high leverage are highly
indebted and hence riskier, resulting in higher cost of debt. How-
ever, if firms are financially constrained, i.e. they do not get access
to debt finance, this relationship might not hold. For instance, a
firm that cannot get a bank loan has low leverage – but it might
be still risky. Net operating working capital measures a firm’s
access to trade credit, which lowers working capital. We measure
working capital (WC) as operating current assets minus operating
current liabilities. Interest coverage refers to earnings before inter-
est and taxes divided by interest expenses (COVER). A high interest
coverage reduces the risk of liquidity default as a firm can use its
earnings to pay interest on debt. Firm size (SIZE) is defined as
the log of total assets. Additional firm-level controls are dividend
payments (DIV), tangible assets (TANG) and return on assets2 We also considered alternative measures based on taking the average level of
debt in year t and t  1, which does not lead to qualitatively different results.(ROA). All variables on the firm-level are expressed relative to total
assets.
Industry controls account for the volatility of cash flows to total
assets (VOL) in an industry defined based on two-digit GICS codes.
Firms operating in industries most affected by climate risk such as
oil, gas, coal, energy & agriculture are flagged with an indicator
variable labelled IND RISK. Our definition of industries more
exposed to climate risks is partly overlaps with Huang et al.
(2018). They use the term ‘vulnerable industries’, which include
energy, oil and food production. They also incorporate business
services, communication, health care and transportation. The cate-
gories of business services and communication are too broad, and
health care and transportation are partly provided by public enti-
ties. Consequently, we use a narrower definition of vulnerable
industries.
Country controls are based on the World Development Indica-
tors database. We consider the log of GDP per capita in constant
2010 USD, annual GDP per capita growth rate (GROWTH), and pop-
ulation density (POP). To account for the quality of institutions and
governance, we include the rule of law (LAW) based on the World
Governance Indicators.
Finally, we include annual average rainfall (M RAIN) and tem-
perature (M TEMP) as well as their standard deviations (SD RAIN,
SD TEMP) provided by the World Bank. These country-level mea-
sures serve as exogenous variables, unaffected by countries’ eco-
nomic condition – but influenced by climate change. To mitigate
the impact of outliers, we apply a winsorization to all variables
at the 5 and 95-percentile. The Appendix summarises the defini-
tions of variables and data sources.5. Results
5.1. Descriptive findings
We estimate the cost of debt using interest expenses and total
debt reported in firms’ balance sheets. Countries that are in the
top 25% regarding climate vulnerability are categorized as high-
risk countries, whereas countries below that threshold are
regarded as medium or low risk countries. If we want to compare
cost of debt for both sub-groups of countries over time, year effects
should be considered. The Asian crisis in 1997 and the Global
Financial Crisis did have an impact on cost of debt, and they
affected developing and developed countries differently due to
loose monetary and fiscal policies in some countries. To account
for these year effects, we ran a regression to explain cost of debt
with year dummies. The year dummies alone only explain 0.45%
of the observed variability in cost of debt. Yet, the F-test with a test
statistic of 32.15 and p-value of 0.000 indicates explanatory power.
Fig. 1 plots year adjusted average cost of debt in low and high-risk
countries. After accounting for year effects, unexplained cost of
debt has remained on a higher level in high-risk countries through-
out the investigation period.
Table 1 reports cost of debt (COD), financial leverage (LEV),
working capital relative to total assets (WC) and interest coverage
(COVER) for low and high-risk countries in terms of their climate
vulnerability. In line with Figure 1, cost of debt is considerably
higher in countries more exposed to climate risk with a median
of 6.1% compared to 3.2%. Companies located in these countries
have higher financial leverage and working capital, although the
difference in financial leverage is modest with a median of 12.7%
compared to 12.2%. Median interest coverage is 4.38 in high-risk
countries, which is considered healthy by rating agencies. How-
ever, companies in low-risk countries exhibit a median in excess
of 8. Descriptive evidence suggests that companies in countries
with more exposure to climate risks exhibit higher indebtedness
Table 1
Cost of debt and financial variables in low and high-risk countries.
Variables N Mean Sd Min
Low-risk countries
COD 76,606 0.165 0.356 0.01
LEV 76,606 0.153 0.131 0.00
WC 76,606 0.167 0.192 0.4
COVER 76,606 42.755 106.838 0.44
High-risk countries
COD 18,431 0.309 0.492 0.01
LEV 18,431 0.166 0.146 0.00
WC 18,431 0.195 0.201 0.4
COVER 18,431 33.721 101.13 0.44
Notes: After listwise deletion, two sub-samples of countries are defined based on whet
former sub-group is labelled high-risk countries. Descriptive statistics for both sub-g
minimums (Min), 25th percentile (p25), medians, 75th percentile (p75), and maximum
Fig. 1. Year adjusted average cost of debt in low and high-risk countries Notes: We
explain cost of debt using year dummies and predict residuals. The average
unexplained cost of debt is plotted for the two sub-groups of countries.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Sd Min
COD 101,532 0.19 0.39 0.01
COE 96,733 0.04 0.02 0.00
COED 101,528 0.10 10.50 94
BETA 99,707 0.60 0.28 0.5
MRP 98,507 0.07 0.03 0.05
VUL 101,532 0.37 0.06 0.26
N VUL 101,532 0.45 0.07 0.28
M RAIN 95,037 103.32 52.70 1.53
SD RAIN 95,037 53.10 31.94 2.67
M TEMP 95,037 13.78 7.50 6.4
SD TEMP 95,037 6.81 2.93 0.22
LEV 101,532 0.16 0.13 0.00
WC 101,532 0.17 0.19 0.4
COVER 101,532 42.31 108.00 0.44
SIZE 101,532 19.74 1.94 13.7
DIV 101,532 0.01 0.02 0.00
TANG 101,532 0.31 0.22 0.00
ROA 101,532 0.07 0.05 0.00
IND RISK 101,532 0.17 0.37 0.00
VOL 101,532 560.04 1143.69 0.31
GDP 101,532 10.03 1.25 6.45
GROWTH 101,532 1.83 2.52 14
POP 101,532 328.07 866.26 1.72
LAW 101,532 1.08 0.72 1.8
Notes: Descriptive statistics include the number of observations (N), means, standard dev
and maximums (Max).
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that financial risk is higher, which might justify higher cost of debt.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics including the number of
observations (N), the mean, median (p50), standard deviation
(sd), the minimum, the maximum, the 25-percentile and the 75-
percentile for the whole sample. The dependent variables refer to
cost of debt (COD) measured based on interest expenses and short
and long-term debt, the components of cost of debt (FIRM COMP,
COUNTRY COMP, LONGRUN COMP) and cost of equity (COE). To
obtain measures of cost of equity two approaches are followed.
First, dividends relative to the value of equity are used to obtain
firm-level measures (COED). Second, country-level measures refer
to the country beta (BETA), i.e. the empirical beta coefficient of
the countries’ leading stockmarket index in relation to the US stock
market index, and the market risk premium (MRP). The dividend-
based measure is of limited use for certain industries, such as
high-tech. Hence, the study focuses on the second approach.
Climate vulnerability is denoted VUL and based on the ND-
GAIN. The following firm-level controls are expressed relative top25 Median p75 Max
5 0.032 0.057 0.107 1.894
0 0.041 0.122 0.235 0.474
08 0.030 0.154 0.291 0.701
2 2.874 8.317 26.626 612.85
5 0.061 0.111 0.26 1.894
0 0.037 0.128 0.268 0.474
08 0.053 0.179 0.325 0.701
2 1.471 4.381 14.625 612.85
her they belong to the top 25% in terms of climate vulnerability or otherwise. The
roups include the number of observations (N), means, standard deviations (Sd),
s (Max).
p25 Median p75 Max
0.03 0.06 0.13 1.89
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10
.38 0.00 0.02 0.05 3096.43
7 0.42 0.55 0.84 1.66
0.06 0.06 0.09 0.23
0.34 0.37 0.37 0.57
0.41 0.46 0.51 0.55
57.03 97.87 142.18 311.04
22.98 56.00 73.05 314.91
8 9.04 11.42 20.90 28.96
4.55 8.05 9.14 15.89
0.04 0.12 0.24 0.47
1 0.03 0.16 0.30 0.70
2.57 7.61 25.07 612.85
3 18.36 19.71 21.21 22.93
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06
0.12 0.27 0.45 0.81
0.03 0.06 0.10 0.20
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
9.15 49.2 375.81 4508.17
9.39 10.7 10.77 11.63
.38 0.8 1.58 2.97 23.94
51.6 253.47 350.54 7915.73
5 0.52 1.34 1.6 2.1
iations (Sd), minimums (Min), 25th percentile (p25), medians, 75th percentile (p75),
Table 3
Measures for climate vulnerability and their relatedness to economic variables.
Sector Indicators Related to
economic variables
Food 1 Projected change of cereal yields Low
2 Projected population change Medium
3 Food import dependency Medium
4 Rural population High
5 Agriculture capacity High
6 Child malnutrition High
Water 1 Projected change of annual runoff Low
2 Projected change of annual
groundwater recharge
Low
3 Fresh water withdrawal rate Low
4 Water dependency ratio Low
5 Dam capacity High
6 Access to reliable drinking water High
Health 1 Projected change of deaths from
climate induced diseases
Medium
2 Projected change in vector-borne
diseases
Medium
3 Dependency on external resource for
health services
High
4 Slum population High
5 Medical staff High
6 Access to improved sanitation
facilities
High
Ecosystems 1 Projected change of biome
distribution
Low
2 Projected change of marine
biodiversity
Low
3 Natural capital dependency High
4 Ecological footprint Medium
5 Protected biome Medium
6 Engagement in international
environmental conventions
Medium
Habitat 1 Projected change of warm periods Low
2 Projected change of flood hazard Low
3 Urban concentration High
4 Age dependency ratio High
5 Quality of trade and transport
infrastructure
High
6 Paved roads High
Infrastructure 1 Projected change of hydropower
generation capacity
Medium
2 Projected change of sea level rise
impacts
Medium
3 Dependency on imported energy Medium
4 Population living under 5 m above
sea level
Medium
5 Electricity access High
6 Disaster preparedness High
6 G. Kling et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105131total assets. They include financial leverage (LEV), net operating
working capital (WC), interest coverage (COVER), cash holding
(CASH), dividend payments (DIV), research and development
(RD), tangible assets (TANG) and return on assets (ROA). Finally,
to account for firm size we use the log of total assets (SIZE).
Country-level controls refer to the log of GDP per capita in con-
stant 2010 USD (GDP), annual GDP per capita growth rate
(GROWTH), population density (POP), and the rule of law (LAW).
Industry measures account for cash flow risk in the industry
(VOL) and flag high-risk industries (IND RISK) such as oil, gas,
energy and agriculture.
5.2. Endogeneity
Trying to explain cost of debt using climate vulnerability and a
set of explanatory variables including macroeconomic controls
might suffer from endogeneity depending on how climate vulner-
ability is measured. A stated in Section 4.2, we use climate vulner-
ability (VUL) compiled by the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation
Initiative (ND-GAIN). ND-GAIN also reports a readiness index,
which combines many economic indicators, increasing the likeli-
hood of endogeneity problems. However, even the climate vulner-
ability index contains some measures, which are potentially
correlated with macroeconomic variables. Table 3 outlines the
underlying measures used in the construction of the climate vul-
nerability index in the six life-supporting sectors (e.g. water, food,
etc.).
To disentangling climate and economic measures in the climate
vulnerability index, we explore the underlying raw data used to
construct the climate vulnerability index and remove measures
that exhibit a strong relation with macroeconomic variables.
Table 3 indicates whether the respective measure has a low, med-
ium or high alleged correlation with economic variables. From raw
data, we re-construct a vulnerability index, which excludes mea-
sures with assumed high correlation with economic variables.
Hence, we take indicators 1, 2 and 3 for the food sector, indicators
1, 2, 3 and 4 for water, 1 and 2 for health, 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 for ecosys-
tems, 1 and 2 for human habitat, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 for infrastruc-
ture. This newly constructed index denoted N_VUL reflects
countries’ climate vulnerability but should be less correlated with
countries’ financial or economic conditions, which might cause
endogeneity.
To test for endogeneity in our panel dataset, we follow
Wooldridge (2010). Starting with a random-effects model on the
firm level, we try to explain cost of debt (COD) using the original
climate vulnerability index (VUL) and a set of control variables
including financial leverage (LEV), working capital (WC), interest
coverage (COVER), firm size (SIZE), dividend payments (DIV), tangi-
ble assets (TANG) and return on assets (ROA).
CODit ¼ a1 þ b1VULjt þ b2SIZEit þ    þ ui þ eit ð4Þ
In Eq. (4), ui refers to the firm-level random effect, capturing
any unobserved firm-level variables. A second equation explains
the alleged endogenous variable, the climate vulnerability index
(VUL), using all explanatory variables in (4) and the newly con-
structed vulnerability index denoted N_VUL.
VULjt ¼ a2 þ d1N VULjt þ bd2SIZEit þ    þwit ð5Þ
From Eq. (5) (see [R1] in Table 4), we obtain the residuals, which
we include in the first Eq. (4). The coefficient of the residual
denoted VUL_hat exhibits a p-value of 0.000. Hence, we reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero, suggesting
that the climate vulnerability index (VUL) is endogenous (see [R2]
Table 4).
Accordingly, an instrumental variable approach is needed; how-
ever, we must ensure that the newly constructed climate vulnera-bility index (N_VUL) is a suitable instrument. Considering GDP per
capita as a proxy for countries’ economic and financial conditions,
the original climate vulnerability index exhibits a very high nega-
tive correlation (0.8676). This is in line with our finding that the
climate vulnerability index (VUL) is endogenous as countries with
low GDP per capita, i.e. challenging economic and financial condi-
tions, tend to score highly in terms of climate vulnerability. The
newly constructed climate vulnerability index (N_VUL) is posi-
tively correlated with the climate vulnerability index (VUL) with
a correlation coefficient of (0.7207) and – most importantly –
shows a much lower negative correlation of 0.3331 with GDP
per capita. These findings hint that the newly constructed index
might be a suitable instrument.
However, to ensure that the newly constructed index passes an
endogeneity test, additional instruments are needed. Using
country-level data provided by the World Bank on monthly tem-
perature and rainfall from 1991 to 2016, we determine annual
average temperature and rainfall (M_RAIN, M_TEMP) as well as
Table 4
Endogeneity tests.






WC 0.012*** 0.100*** 0.006*** 0.119***
COVER 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
SIZE 0.006*** 0.034*** 0.001*** 0.029***
DIV 0.324*** 0.774*** 0.245*** 0.244
TANG 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.005*** 0.087***









N 101,532 101,532 95,037 95,037
Note: [R2] and [R4] refer to firm-level random effects with clustered standard errors. [R1] and [R2] are OLS regression to predict climate vulnerability (VUL) and the newly
constructed index (N_VUL), respectively. VUL_hat and N_VUL_hat refer to residuals from equations [R1] and [R2], respectively. For random effects models, overall (o), within
(w) and between (b) R-squared are reported.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
G. Kling et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105131 7standard deviations of temperature and rainfall (SD_RAIN,
SD_TEMP). The four exogenous variables, i.e. not affected by
country-level economic variables, are used in equation (5) and
explain 79.4% of the observed variability of N_VUL (see [R3] in
Table 4). Inserting the predicted residual from this equation into
the first equation leads to an insignificant coefficient of N_VUL_hat,
suggesting that the newly constructed index is indeed exogenous
and is a suitable instrument (see [R4] in Table 4).
Having found a valid instrument, we adopt an instrumental
variables panel-data model, where our constructed climate vulner-
ability index serves as an instrument for the ‘off the shelf’ climate
vulnerability index. Firm-level effects are modelled using random
effects, and our models include country and year dummies to cap-
ture any unobserved year effects or country-specific effects.
5.3. The determinants of cost of debt
Selecting cost of debt as dependent variable, five multivariate
models provide insights into the impact of climate vulnerability
(VUL) on firms’ cost of debt. Table 5 presents the five model spec-
ifications. In line with Section 5.2, all models refer to instrumental
variable regressions, where the newly constructed climate vulner-
ability index (N_VUL) serves as an instrument for the ND-GAIN cli-
mate vulnerability index (VUL). To account for unobserved
country-level and year effects, all specifications add country and
year dummies. As we work with panel data, i.e. firms observed
over time, all models also consider firm-level random effects.
Hence, we can be confident that any remaining partial impact of
climate vulnerability is not explained by unobserved firm, country
or year effects or affected by an endogeneity bias due to the con-
struction of the ND-GAIN climate vulnerability index.
Specification [A1] demonstrates that climate vulnerability as a
single factor increases firms’ cost of debt. Model [A2] incorporates
firm controls, highlighting expected partial impacts such as nega-
tive effects of firm size (SIZE), working capital (WC), interest cover-
age (COVER) and tangible assets (TANG). Specification [A3] adds
industry measures and demonstrates that firms in industries with
more pronounced cash flow volatility (VOL) do exhibit higher cost
of debt, while other partial impacts remain unchanged. Operatingin a high-risk industry such as such as oil, gas, energy and agricul-
ture (IND RISK) does not seem to add explanatory power.
Adding country-level controls in model [A4] changes the sign
of climate vulnerability but no other partial effects. Hence, even
after accounting for endogeneity of the ND-GAIN climate vulner-
ability index some problems remain as the rule of law and GDP
per capita are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of
0.882. Finally, model [A5] adds financial leverage (LEV), which
is associated with higher cost of debt, which seems to be counter
intuitive. However, if firms face high cost of debt, they might be
forced to look for alternative sources of finance, reducing their
financial leverage. This effect might also explain that high divi-
dend payments (DIV) are associated with high cost of debt, which
can be used as a proxy for cost of equity. Firms with higher prof-
itability (ROA) seem to face higher cost of debt. In countries with
expensive access to debt, internal finance is the predominant
source of funding, explaining the positive association between
cost of debt and ROA.
To disentangle the impact of climate vulnerability on cost of
debt and the alleged impact on access to finance, which might
drive our findings regarding the negative impact of financial lever-
age on cost of debt, Section 5.5 specifies structural equation mod-
els (SMEs). In these models, we can also account for the fact that
countries with low GDP per capita tend to also exhibit weak
governance.
5.4. Cost of equity
Establishing the impact of climate vulnerability on cost of
equity is more challenging as firm level proxies of cost of equity
are more difficult to obtain. There are two approaches to estimat-
ing cost of equity. First, one could rely on a dividend growth model
and use dividends relative to the value of equity as a proxy. Our
measure denoted COED refers to this approach. However, many
firms, mostly in the high technology sector, do not pay any divi-
dends, limiting the usefulness of this measure. Second, the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) suggests that cost of equity of a firm i
can be estimated using a stochastic market model as in (5), where
rmt represents the market index and rft is the risk-free rate.
Table 5
Determinants of cost of debt.
[A1] [A2] [A3] [A4] [A5]
VUL 4.360*** 3.270** 3.295** 0.643 0.201
WC 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.142*** 0.112***
COVER 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
SIZE 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.019***
DIV 0.653*** 0.653*** 0.654*** 0.119
TANG 0.295*** 0.293*** 0.269*** 0.134***
ROA 0.365*** 0.366*** 0.359*** 0.033
IND_RISK 0.009 0.006 0.004






R2w 0.058 0.095 0.095 0.106 0.216
R2b 0.092 0.152 0.153 0.161 0.295
R2o 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.125
N 101,532 101,532 101,532 101,532 101,532
Note: All models refer to instrumental variable regressions, where the newly constructed climate vulnerability index (N_VUL) serves as an instrument for the ND-GAIN
climate vulnerability index (VUL). All specifications add country and year dummies. All models use firm-level random effects. Overall (o), within (w) and between (b) R-
squared are reported.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
8 G. Kling et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105131rE ¼ rf þ b Erm  rf
  ð6Þ
Eq. (6) is difficult to estimate in less developed markets as these
economies tend to be less integrated, resulting in lower betas.
Moreover, betas tend to vary over time, and the quality of data
(e.g. lack of trading) is an issue. Hence, we estimate country-
betas, comparing the leading stock market index with the US mar-
ket, i.e. we take the perspective of an US investor. The difference
between countries’ leading stock market index and the risk-free
rate is the market risk premium (MRP).
Table 6 shows multivariate models that explain country-level
measures such as the expected cost of equity (COE) using countryTable 6






















Note: All models refer to instrumental variable regressions, where the newly construc
climate vulnerability index (VUL). Specifications [B1] to [B3] refer to country-level models
effects and adds country and year dummies. All specifications add country and year dum
are reported.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.betas and countries’ market-risk premium in column [B1], whereas
specification [B2] explains country betas and [B3] countries’ mar-
ket risk premia. All models refer to instrumental variable regres-
sions, where the newly constructed climate vulnerability index
(N_VUL) serves as an instrument for the ND-GAIN climate vulner-
ability index (VUL). Specifications [B1] to [B3] are country-level
models, which include year dummies.
As shown in specification [B1], overall climate vulnerability
does not have a significant partial impact on countries’ cost of
equity. Models [B2] and [B3] show that climate vulnerability



















ted climate vulnerability index (N_VUL) serves as an instrument for the ND-GAIN
. Year dummies are added in these three models. Model [B4] uses firm-level random
mies. For random effects models, overall (o), within (w) and between (b) R-squared
G. Kling et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105131 9risk premium. Countries more exposed to climate risk tend to be
less developed and hence less integrated with developed markets
such as the US, reducing the correlation between markets, cap-
tured by the country beta. In contrast, the market risk premium
– both effects seem to offset each other. Using our firm-level proxy
of cost of equity, model [B4] applies firm-level random effects and
adds country and year dummies. Model [B4] cannot establish any
partial impact on firm-level proxies using dividend payments. In
summary, there is limited evidence that climate vulnerability con-
tributes to higher cost of equity.
5.5. Structural equation model
The instrumental variable approach used to derive the findings
in Tables 5 and 6 did account for the endogeneity of the ND-GAIN
climate vulnerability index. However, two additional issues
remain: first, GDP per capita and the rule of law are highly corre-
lated; second, access to finance might be constrained in countries
more exposed to climate risk. The latter might explain our findings
based on model [A5] in Table 5 that firms with higher leverage
exhibit lower cost of debt, which is counter intuitive.
To disentangle the effect of climate vulnerability and its alleged
association with cost of debt and access to finance, we specify a
structural equation model. Fig. 2 illustrates a simplified structure
of the model, which permits that climate vulnerability affects cost
of debt directly and indirectly through its impact on access toFig. 2. Illustrated structural equation model Notes:We estimate four equations: (1)
explaining cost of debt (COD) with a set of explanatory variables including leverage
(LEV) and climate vulnerability (VUL); (2) explaining the rule of law (LAW) using
GDP per capita; (3) explaining climate vulnerability (VUL) using the newly
constructed index (N_VUL) and GDP; (4) explaining access to finance (LEV) using
climate vulnerability and other variables.finance, i.e. firms positioned in countries with high climate vulner-
ability might not get the level of debt needed. Hence, these finan-
cially constrained firms exhibit low leverage and high working
capital as other sources of funding are used such as trade credit.
To derive a model with good fit, we start with a parsimonious
specification and add neglected links or error covariances into
the model as suggested by modification indices. The initial specifi-
cation takes model [A5] to explain cost of debt (COD). It then adds
additional equations to capture the link between countries’ GDP
per capita and the rule of law and – similar to our instrumental
variable approach – the impact of GDP per capita and the newly
constructed climate vulnerability index on the ND-GAIN climate
vulnerability index. Finally, a fourth equation models financial
leverage, as a measure of access to debt finance, using climate vul-
nerability, firm-level and macroeconomic variables as controls.
This initial model exhibits inadequate goodness-of-fit measures
as the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is
0.108, above the cut-off point of 0.1, and the Comparative Fit Index
CFI is 0.944, slightly below 0.95 suggested by Acock (2013). Hence,
in line with Wooldridge (2010) and Sörbom (1989), we determine
modification indices and incorporate additional variables (one-by-
one) and covariances between error terms until we obtain a model
that satisfies these criteria. Finally, we add country and year-
dummies to capture any unobserved variables.
Climate vulnerability (VUL) has a positive direct effect on cost of
debt shown in column one [C1] of Table 7 in line with previous
models [A1] to [A4]. In addition, column three [C3] shows that
companies based in countries with high climate vulnerability exhi-
bit lower financial leverage. That is, after controlling for firm-level
variables (firm size, interest coverage, dividend payments, tangible
assets, return on assets) and macroeconomic variables (GDP,
growth, population growth, rule of law), these firms do not take
or get the same expected level of debt. Hence, climate vulnerability
has an indirect effect through restricting access to finance. Column
two [C2] reiterates our finding that the ND-GAIN climate vulnera-
bility index is correlated with GDP per capita and the newly con-
structed climate vulnerability index (N_VUL). Finally, column
four [C4] shows the interrelation between GDP per capita and
the rule of law. The effect of the rule of law is more complicated,
as the direct effect on cost of debt is negative [C1] – but firms
located in countries with better governance can achieve higher
financial leverage, providing a positive indirect effect of the rule
of law.
Are the direct and indirect effects of climate vulnerability on
cost of debt of economic significance? On average, climate vulner-
ability has increased by 0.0057 from 1991 to 2017, which resulted
in a direct effect of 0.0057  1.102 = 0.0063, i.e. on average cost of
debt has increased by 0.63%. In addition, the indirect effect through
climate vulnerability’s impact on financial leverage has con-
tributed to 0.0057  (0.071)  (1.116) = 0.0005. Hence, the
combined impact on cost of debt has been 0.63% + 0.05% = 0.68%.6. Conclusion
Our article combines the effect of climate vulnerability on firms’
cost of capital as well as financial exclusion of firms. Our analysis
highlights a previously under-appreciated economic cost of cli-
mate change for climate vulnerable developing economies. Our
results suggest that companies in countries with a greater expo-
sure to climate risks exhibit higher financing costs and are finan-
cially more constrained.
This has significant implications for economic development:
higher corporate financing cost and financial exclusion restrain
economic growth and development, reduce tax revenue, and limit
the scope of governments to undertake investments in public
Table 7
Structural equation model.
Dependent variable [C1] [C2] [C3] [C4]
COD VUL LEV LAW
VUL 1.102** – 0.071*** –
N_VUL 0.426*** – –
LEV 1.116*** – – –
WC 0.103*** – – –
COVER 0.000*** – 0.000*** –
SIZE 0.016*** – 0.016*** –
DIV 0.145 – 0.054* –
TANG 0.136*** – 0.099*** –
ROA 0.048 – 0.235*** –
IND_RISK 0.006 – – –
VOL 0.000 – – –
GDP 0.179*** 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.506***
GROWTH 0.002* – 0.001*** –
POP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** –




* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
10 G. Kling et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105131infrastructure and climate adaptation. This, in turn, contributes to
greater vulnerability, curbs economies’ growth prospects and puts
the corporate sector in climate vulnerable developing economies at
a disadvantage when competing in both domestic and foreign mar-
kets. Thus, the climate vulnerability risk premium could cause a
vicious circle, where a higher cost of capital reduces both public
and private sector investment, suppresses firms’ growth and public
tax revenue, and limits the scope for public adaptation finance.
Given that climate risks are expected to increase in the future,
climate vulnerability is likely to increase without adaptation
investments that can mitigate these risks, which implies that the
cost of capital for the public and private sector in climate vulnera-
ble economies are bound to increase unless this vicious circle can
be reversed. For this to happen, climate vulnerable developing
economies – which have not caused global warming and are not
able to address the root causes through national action – will need
international support. International support through innovative
risk transfer mechanisms would help to reduce the cost of capital
in climate vulnerable countries, enabling private and public invest-
ments that will empower these countries to enter a virtuous circle
where higher investments and growth allow for greater adaptation
finance, greater resilience and lower climate vulnerability, which
will reduce the cost of capital, facilitate further investment, and
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Government.Appendix. Definitions of variables and data sourcesVariable Definition Data sourceCOD Cost of debt measured as interest expense in year t divided by total
debt reported in period tThomson Reuters Eikon databaseCOE Country-level cost of equity estimated using country betas and
market risk premiumsDamodaran (2013)COED Firm-level cost of equity measured as dividend payments relative to
equityThomson Reuters Eikon databaseBETA Country betas are estimated using each countries’ leading stock
market index regressed on the return of the US stock marketThomson Reuters Eikon databaseMRP Market risk premium defined as average stock market return minus
the risk-free rate proxied by 10-year US government bond yieldDamodaran (2013)
G. Kling et al. /World Development 137 (2021) 105131 11Appendix (continued)Variable Definition Data sourceVUL ND-GAIN climate vulnerability index ND-GAIN
N VUL Newly constructed climate vulnerability index (see Section 5.2) ND-GAIN (raw data)
M RAIN Annual average rainfall based on monthly data World Bank
SD RAIN Annual standard deviation of rainfall based on monthly data World Bank
M TEMP Annual average temperature based on monthly data World Bank
SD TEMP Annual standard deviation of temperature based on monthly data World Bank
LEV Leverage defined as the ratio of a firm’s total debt to total assets Thomson Reuters Eikon database
WC Working capital refers to operating current assets minus operating
current liabilities
Thomson Reuters Eikon databaseCOVER Interest coverage refers to earnings before interest and taxes
divided by interest expensesThomson Reuters Eikon databaseSIZE Firm size is defined as the log of total assets Thomson Reuters Eikon database
DIV Dividend payments relative to total assets Thomson Reuters Eikon database
TANG Tangible assets relative to total assets Thomson Reuters Eikon database
ROA Return on assets Thomson Reuters Eikon database
IND RISK Industries most affected by climate risk such as oil, gas, coal, energy
& agriculture
Thomson Reuters Eikon databaseVOL Volatility of cash flows to total assets in an industry defined based
on two-digit GICS codesThomson Reuters Eikon databaseGDP Log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD World Development Indicators
GROWTH Annual GDP per capita growth rate World Development Indicators
POP Population density World Development Indicators
LAW The rule of law World Governance IndicatorsReferences
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